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Abstract
Password databases form one of the backbones of nowadays web applications.
Every web application needs to store its users’ credentials (email and password) in
an efficient way, and in popular applications (Google, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) these
databases can grow to store millions of user credentials simultaneously. However,
despite their critical nature and susceptibility to targeted attacks, the techniques
used for securing password databases are still very rudimentary, opening the way to
devastating attacks. Just in the year of 2016, and as far as publicly disclosed, there
were more than 500 million passwords stolen in internet hacking attacks.
To solve this problem we commit to study several schemes like property-preserving
encryption schemes (e.g. deterministic encryption), encrypted data-structures that
support operations (e.g. searchable encryption), partially homomorphic encryption
schemes, and commodity trusted hardware (e.g. TPM and Intel SGX).
In this thesis we propose to make a summary of the most efficient and secure tech-
niques for password database management systems that exist today and recreating
them to accommodate a new and simple universal API.
We also propose SSPM(Simple Secure Password Management), a new password
database scheme that simultaneously improves efficiency and security of current
solutions existing in literature. SSPM is based on Searchable Symmetric Encryption
techniques, more specifically ciphered data structures, that allow efficient queries
with the minimum leak of access patterns. SSPM adapts these structures to work
with the necessary operation of password database schemes preserving the security
guarantees.
Furthermore, SSPM explores the use of trusted hardware to minimize the revela-
tion of access patterns during the execution of operations and protecting the storage
of cryptographic keys. Experimental results with real password databases shows us
that SSPM has a similar performance compared with the solutions used today in
the industry, while simultaneous increasing the offered security conditions.
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Resumo
Base de dados de passwords formam o esqueleto de aplicações web atuais. Todas
as aplicações web necessitam de armazenar as credenciais do utilizador (email e
password) de uma maneira eficiente, e em aplicações populares (Google, Facebook,
Twitter, etc.) estas bases de dados podem crescer e ter que armazenar milhões de
credenciais simultaneamente. No entanto, apesar da sua natureza crítica e suscep-
tibilidade a ataques, as técnicas usadas para armazenar passwords continuam a ser
muito rudimentares, abrindo o caminho para ataques devastadores. Só no ano de
2016, e apenas os números partilhados, houve mais de 500 milhões de passwords
roubadas devido a ataques de hackers.
Para resolver este problema estamos determinados en estudar os principais es-
quemas de cifra existentes, tais como esquemas criptográficos que preservam pro-
priedades (por ex. Cifra Determinista), estruturas de dados cifradas que suportam
operações (por ex. Cifra Pesquisável), Encriptação Homomórfica Completa e Parcial,
e Hardware Confiável (como TPM e Intel SGX).
Nesta tese fazemos um resumo resumo das técnicas mais eficientes e seguras para
base de dados de passwords que existem atualmente, e recriá-las para acomodar uma
nova e simples API universal.
Também propomos SSPM (Simple Secure Password Management), um novo pro-
tocolo criptográfico para proteção de BDs depasswords que simultaneamente melhora
a eficiência e segurança de soluções atuais da literatura. SSPM é baseado em técnicas
de Cifra Simétrica Pesquisável, mais especificamente estruturas de dados cifradas
que permitem operações de consulta eficientes com revelação de mínima informa-
ção.SSPM adapta estas estruturas de forma a suportar as operações necessárias
numa BD de passwords e preservando as suas condições de segurança.
SSPM explora também o uso de hardware confiável moderno baseado em ates-
tação (TPM e Intel SGX) como forma de minimizar ainda mais a revelação de
informações durante a execução de operações e como forma de proteção de chaves
criptográficas. Resultados experimentais com BDs de passwords reais demonstram
que SSPM possui um desempenho semelhante a soluções usadas hoje na industria,
ix
simultaneamente melhorando em muito as condições de segurança oferecidas.
Palavras-chave: Aplicações Web, Base de Dados de Passwords, Cifra Simétrica
Pesquisável, Hardware Confiável.
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Introduction
1.1 Context and Motivation
Nowadays, data in cloud computing is usually available from everywhere in the
world. Password databases is by far the most important piece of data that an
average user can have stored in an outside storage system. As the times passes,
cloud computing is getting more cheaper, more popular and with more hardware
capabilities, so it’s only natural that its usage has increased exponentially in recent
years and more companies tend to store important data in the cloud, which includes
password databases.
As the access to the Internet continues to grow everyday, more and more people
around the globe tend to join it. More people means increased storage capacity
needed to store user’s personal data in popular applications like Google, Twitter,
Facebook, Instagram, just to name a few. Each of these websites contains sensible
information about their users, which is usually protected by a username and a
password. That’s what always separated ones personal information from the rest
of the world, their password, just like your house key protects your house from
everybody coming in uninvited, the users password supposedly is required and
mandatory for them to access their account in web applications.
1.2 Problem Statement
Despite their critical nature and susceptibility to targeted attacks, the techniques
used today for securing password databases are still very rudimentary, opening the
1
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way to devastating attacks. Adversaries, including internet hackers, tend to explore
new and innovative ways to attack and access the data, and unfortunately they’re
still very successful.
Just in the year of 2016, and as far as publicly disclosed, there were more than
500 million passwords stolen in Internet hacking attacks [49]. Last year, on 2017
all 3 billion of Yahoo accounts were breached [30]. This accounted for the users full
name, usernames and password.
Password databases are particularly susceptible to snapshot attackers, which is
a hacker that may get a small time window of access to the database and makes a
snapshot copy of all available information. If the data in the database storage is not
encrypted, and is just in plain text, the adversary can just look at it and learn all
the user’s credential data. If the users credentials in the snapshot copy are hashed,
the adversary can just run a Brute Force or a Dictionary Attack to create a collision,
among others ways to discover the original plaintext that was hashed.
A common solution to this problem is to encrypt the users credential data,
and every time the user wishes to enter the system, he provides its username and
password. The system then decrypts its stored data with the corresponding key and
compares the decrypted plaintext user’s password with the user’s entered password.
One problem with this solution is that there’s a time frame in which the original
password is in its plaintext format, for the system to make the comparison between
the password values, making the system vulnerable to an attack in this time frame,
as the adversary can create a snapshot at this moment to gain the original plaintext
password.
Another solution from the state of the art is to encrypt the data in a way that
allows computations over the encrypted data. However this method is very expensive
and somewhat slow, causing it to be inefficient for the users to make operations like
logging in or registering.
These are the reasons some websites still store the users passwords with just the
hashed values of them, or just in plaintext, to remain fast and simple for the system
when a user wants to complete a login operation.
So in this thesis we will try to answer the following question:
Can we build a secure password database system that once attacked by an adversary
can not be compromised and still be efficient enough for users to login and register
under the ”one second” usability mark?
2
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1.3 Objectives
SSPM (Simple Secure Password Management) is a new password database system
that protects users credentials while allowing them to efficiently perform login and
register operations. SSPM uses a not so usual way of storing the users credential so
it can better evade attacks of adversaries aimed to a specific user. Usually the user’s
credential are stored in a Map (where the key is a the username of the users, and
the value is the users password, or a table (in where there’s a column for each of
the user’s credential). SSPM hashes the result of the concatenation of the username,
the password and a fixed salt, and stores it in a set. When the users logins to the
system, SSPM makes the same hashing of the concatenation process, and verifies if
the result of the hash is inside the set. In an affirmative state, the user is granted
access.
Our system, with the help of cryptographic techniques for computing on encrypted
data and the help of Intel SGX, TPM and other secure hardware, can securely
defend against attacks made by adversaries and can avoid the attack of leaking
access patterns, even to rogue servers and malicious OS and HyperVisors.
We implemented the most used password database mechanisms used in the
industry today, and designed an universal API with the most common password
database operations. The objective of this is to easily use and test the encryption
and hashing schemes that are most used today. We also used stress tests to all
implemented systems to compare the performance of the systems. The implemented
API makes the process of testing much easier, and it can also be used by other users
to easily test the schemes.
Following the objectives we propose as main objective to build more secure and
efficient methods of password database management.
1.4 Contributions
In the list below we enumerate the main contributions provided in this thesis:
• We design and implement an universal API with the most used password
database management methods are used today in the industry and in the liter-
ature. The API includes login, register, change username, change password and
delete user operations. For the implementation of existing password database
schemes (like B-Crypt, and PolyPasswordHasher) we used open-source reposi-
tories (that will be later mentioned) and make some changes to the code, while
keeping the copyright authors, to adapt its implementation to our API.
3
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• We designed and implemented new cryptographic mechanisms to protect pass-
word databases. We call our scheme SSPM (Simple Secure Password Manage-
ment). Several versions of this scheme were implemented, each one adding
more security measures but trading off performance.
• Conception of a scheme for password database management that we called
SSPM, based on trusted hardware, such as Intel’s technology Intel SGX (Soft-
ware Guard Extensions). We keep the same basic mechanisms of SSPM, but
make all cryptographic operations inside the Enclave created by SGX, as well
as store the cryptographic keys inside the enclave.
• Experimentally evaluate the performance of our schemes and compare them
previous works from the literature, using the API that we mentioned above.
To achieve a more realistic performance test we acquired a password database
data set based on various password leaks, that were revealed through the years.
• The design of a GUI (Graphical User Interface) so we can better demonstrate
the work done by us, and give the reader a better understanding of the imple-
mented password database schemes and show how they store user’s credentials.
By the end of the work in this thesis, we explained 2 different solutions to be
presented, that are proofed to be as (if not more) secure and efficient then current and
past methods used in the industry. For efficiency we measured the time complexity
of how fast the schemes can perform the operations of the built API.
1.5 Report Organization
The remaining of this report is organized by the following structure:
• Chapter 2: In this chapter we present the important background and related
work that includes fundamental concepts necessary to the understanding of
the concept of this thesis.
• Chapter 3: In this chapter called "Designed Solutions", we present the methods
involved in the design and ideas of the password database schemed used in
the thesis, like the initial view of the system model and its architecture, the
adversary model, and the detailed algorithms of our schemes.
• Chapter 4: In this chapter called "Implementation and Evaluation", we show
in more detail on how we implemented various common hashing schemes and
other used password database scheme, and implemented it to our universal API.
4
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We also show how we implemented the versions of SSPM that are only based in
cryptography, and how we implemented the versions that depend on Hardware
Modules, like TPM and Intel SGX. In the second part of the chapter we show
the performance evaluation that we made for the implemented schemes, using
stress tests to the Login and Register operations through our API, using up
to ten million users entries for the performance tests.
• Chapter 5: In this chapter, simply entitled "Conclusion", we show our con-
clusions on the making of this thesis and also leave a section dedicated to
the future work that can be later picked up by another researcher to further
progress the work made in this thesis.
5
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Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we discuss the relevant background and related work with importance
for this thesis. The chapter is divided into three sections. In Section 2.1 we present
several ways to make operations on encrypted data on a cloud server. In Section 2.2
we present Searchable Encryption and Searchable Symmetric Encryption. In section
2.3 we present the state of the art in password databases and also present the most
common attacks made by adversaries on those.
2.1 Computation On Encrypted Data
Everyday cloud computing gets faster, more available and cheaper, so it’s only natural
that extra users are joining this types of services to store their data. Cloud computing
enable network on demand and convenient access to a shared pool of configurable
computing resources like networks, servers, storage, applications and services [37]
and can be provisioned and released with minimal user effort or interaction with the
service provider. But the main advantage of cloud computing is that is accessible
from almost anywhere in the world, at any time. As long as there is Internet access,
the user can access the services of the cloud to outsource his data and later can
request to access it and make computations over it. Cloud users include private
parties and also companies, that use this system as the primary focus to their business
models, so they don’t have to expand their resources to servers infrastructures and
have the extra cost of maintaining them.
The problem with cloud computing is that an unwanted party, like the manufac-
turer, a software engineer or even an Internet attacker, can see the users data if it
7
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Figure 2.1: User-Cloud Interaction
is not encrypted. That’s why the data stored in the storage cloud should always be
encrypted, but this raises the problem that computations can’t be simply done in
an encrypted form.
Computation over encrypted data introduces several cryptographic methods to se-
curely perform computations without revealing private and sensitive information to
the cloud, and without requiring the user’s secret key. This means that the user
or the cloud server doesn’t have to decrypt the whole encrypted data to perform a
desired function [22], as the computations are done on the encrypted form of the
data.
In the following sub-sections we are going to discuss Property-Preserving Encryp-
tion (Deterministic Encryption and Order Preserving Encryption), Homomorphic
Encryption (Fully Homomorphic Encryption and Partial Homomorphic Encryption)
and Computations on Trusted Hardware (TPM, Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone).
2.1.1 Property-preserving Encryption
Property-preserving Encryption enables some properties to be preserved on en-
crypted data. For this the algorithm has to preserve some properties of the encrypted
data, such as its order. These associated properties allow for some pre-determined
computation on the encrypted data such as range queries, even if the data was
generated independently and individually [42]. In the following sections we present
two types of Property-Preserving Encryption.
2.1.1.1 Deterministic Encryption
Deterministic Encryption is a cryptosystem, that given a certain plaintext and key,
always produces the same exact ciphertext, even over separate executions.
We can see an example of Deterministic Encryption in Figure 2.2. In this example
there are two different runs of Deterministic Encryption, in the first run we input
8
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Deterministic 
Encryption
Deterministic 
Encryption
7d4da881d5c282a69516a9826a3fe260
0e15a89e3cac8745ff316cda7256b1966
7e41a0c153e9286e2746f2baf77a772Message 1
Message 1
7d4da881d5c282a69516a9826a3fe260
0e15a89e3cac8745ff316cda7256b1966
7e41a0c153e9286e2746f2baf77a772
Key: 8xy5egcl9r8jjf4a
Key: 8xy5egcl9r8jjf4a
b996e7eaf8a2b199279360a76b18ab92
c4191d84b37e1243c90cd1d7bb96656
7
d1e4ce110b1511cf8ecc9f35ec1897447
562fab2b51b437c7bace27f785adc65
Message 2
Message 3
Figure 2.2: Example of Deterministic Encryption
Message1 and Message2 along with a key, and get a different result for each one. In
the second run we input the same Message1, and Message3, with the same key as
the first run and also get a pair of results. As we can note, the output for the same
input (Message1 + key) is the same for each run and when the input is different,
the output will also be different (see the output of Message2 and Message3).
2.1.1.2 Order-Preserving Encryption
Order preserving encryption is a deterministic encryption scheme, that preservers
the order of the numerical plaintext [5]. This is useful because it allows efficient
range queries on encrypted data. This way an untrusted database server can index
sensitive data in encrypted form, inside a data structure (such as a b-tree) permitting
range queries (for example, from a to b), to locate the desired function in logarithm
time. Basically, given two plaintexts x and y the definition of OPE can be given as
follows:
x > y−> encryption(x)> encryption(y).
In figure Figure 2.3 we can see a example of how to store the encrypted data
with OPE in a database storage. The figure contains a reference table and a b-tree.
The reference table contains the hexadecimal value of every plaintext and also the
ciphertext, that is the result of deterministic encryption on the plaintext, so the
algorithm can calculate where on the b-tree should look for a value to insert or
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remove, and also allowing queries. An operation on this structured data should have
on average time complexity of log(n), with n being the number of elements of data
in the database [44].
Figure 2.3: B-Tree of the result of a OPE with reference table
2.1.2 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic Encryption comes from homomorphic abstract algebra, that preserves
a structure map between the algebraic structures. Basically, Homomorphic Encryp-
tion allows some computations to be made in the ciphered text as if they were in
plaintext and outputs the result in ciphered text that when deciphered matches the
result as if the same operation was made in the original plaintext [59]. There are
several drawbacks to Homomorphic Encryption, specially on Fully Homomorphic
Encryption, causing it to not be very practical due to its efficiency. Partially Homo-
morphic Encryption cuts some of the costs of Fully Homomorphic Encryption.
In the following sections we present two types of Homomorphic Encryption.
2.1.2.1 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Fully Homomorphic Encryption [17] allows for arbitrary computations on encrypted
data, namely multiplication and addition operations. Despite the extensive work
done in this subject, Fully Homomorphic Encryption continues to not be considered
efficient enough for everyday use. One example of this, is the work made in [18], a
Fully Homomorphic Encryption work was accomplished with an AES Circuit, but
it takes 7 hours to make the first successful operation (despite having the algorithm
become faster as more rounds are made) and it also requires a machine with 256 GB
of RAM to run it.
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2.1.2.2 Partially Homomorphic Encryption
Partially Homomorphic Encryption is a form of Homomorphic Encryption, only
certain mathematical homomorphic operations can be made, like additive or multi-
plicative homomorphism, but not both operations [40]. A Partially Homorphomic
Encryption supports adding Homomorphism if and only if: ξ(x) + ξ(y) = ξ(x+ y).
A Partially Homorphomic Encryption supports Multiplicative Homomorphism if
and only if: ξ(x) ∗ ξ(y) = ξ(x ∗ y). Several algorithms are presented below that pre-
serve one of the two mathematical operations available on Partially Homorphomic
Encryption:
• RSA
RSA, or more specifically unpadded RSA, is used to exhibit multiplicative
homomorphism. It multiplies two RSA ciphertexts values, with the decrypted
result being the same as if the multiplication was made with the two values in
plaintext citeGentry09.
Being the modulus m and exponent e constant integers, the homomorphic
property is given by:
ξ(x) ∗ ξ(y) = xe ∗ ye modm= (x ∗ y)e modm= ξ(x ∗ y) (2.1)
• ElGamal
Similarly to RSA, ElGamal is also used to exhibit multiplicative homomor-
phism, which means multiplying various elements of a ciphered text and de-
crypting the result equals to multiplying the values in their original plaintext
in unencrypted form [36]. The ElGamal algorithm exhibits multiplicative ho-
momorphism working this way:
Given a plain text x1, private key a, public keys k1, k2 and k3 and a nonce
no1 where ξ(x1,no1) = (y1,y2), where y1 and y2 mean:
y1≡ k1no1 mod k3
y2≡ x1 ∗ k2no1 mod k3
(2.2)
Multiplying the plaintexts x1 and x2:
x1 ∗x2 = (y1,y2) ∗ (y3,y4)
= (y1 ∗ y3,y2 ∗ y4)
= (k1no1 ∗ k1no2,(x1 ∗ k2no1) ∗ (x2 ∗ k2no2))
= (k1no1+no2,x1 ∗x2 ∗ k2no1+no2)
(2.3)
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Decrypting will give us:
decrypt(k1no1+no2,x1 ∗x2 ∗ k2no1+no2) = x1 ∗x2 (2.4)
• Paillier
Paillier is used to exhibit additive homomorphism. Each component of mul-
tiple ciphertext is multiplied with its respective component. The result when
decrypted is equal to the sum of the values in plaintext [41]. As the original
paper states, the Encryption and Decryption in this algorithm is made as it is
shown bellow.
Encryption:
plaintext m< n
select a random r < n
ciphertext c= gm ∗ rn mod n2
Decryption:
ciphertext c < n2
plaintext m = L(c
γ mod n2)
L(gγ mod n2) mod n
As stated previously the result of multiplying two ciphertexts values will decrypt
to the sum of those two values in plaintext, given that x is the first plaintext
and y is the second one:
decrypt(encrypted(x,r1) ∗ encrypted(y,r2) mod n2) = x+ y mod n (2.5)
Pailler encryptions also allows the use of homomorphic multiplication of ci-
phertext with plaintext.
2.1.3 Computations on Trusted Hardware
Computations on Trusted Hardware is about developing trusted technologies that
guarantee the user safety while running the software on theirs devices. A device can
be considered trusted if it always behaves in an expected manner even if an adversary
tries to attack it [34]. In this section we present several technologies that attempt to
execute software on a remote computer owned and maintained by an untrusted party,
with some integrity and confidentiality guarantees [12]. In Figure 2.4 the user relies
on a Remote Computer, owned by an untrusted party, to perform some computation
on. The user trusts the manufacturer that has a piece of hardware in the remote
computer, so the user has assurance of the computation and confidentiality of its
data.
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Figure 2.4: Trust Computing on Secure Remote Computation [34]
2.1.3.1 TPM
TPM refers to Trusted Platform Module and is a hardware module incorporated
and deployed in a motherboard, smart card or processor that provides the resources
needed for trusted computing [51].
Through secret sharing and cooperation with other hardware and software com-
ponents, the TPM provisions three services: authenticated boot, certification, and
encryption.
The authenticated boot service allows to verify that the boot of the entire oper-
ating system is made in well defined stages at which only approved versions of the
modules of the OS are loaded. This could be done by verifying a digital signature
associated with each module. Additionally, a tamper-proof log of the loading process
is kept by the TPM that later can be consulted. Tampering is detected using crypto-
graphic hash functions. It is also possible to configure the TPM to include additional
hardware and application and utility software in its TCB given some restrictions to
prevent threats. This service can be used to guarantee that the machine which hosts
the TPM is in a well defined and trusted state after booting.
Despite the advances in TPM, this technology seems to have been compromised
in 2010 by Christopher Tarnovsky, but this was disregarded by the manufacturing
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company of the chips, Infineon, as the company stated that it was necessary a high
skill level of hardware experience, as it required removal of the chip’s case top layer,
then tapping into a data bus to get the unencrypted data [53]. In October 2017 a
new code library by Infineon, exposed some vulnerabilities with the system, as it
allowed some private keys to be guessed from the public keys, subsequently a lot of
data was compromised [21].
2.1.3.2 Intel® SGX
Intel®SGX (Intel’s Software Guard Extensions) is a set of CPU instructions that
can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and data called
enclaves [24]. SGX was introduced with the Skylake architecture and is considered
the successor to TPM. In SGX, the hardware establishes a secure container and then
the user uploads its data and desired computation to the secure container. SGX
protects the data’s confidentiality and integrity while the computation on the data
is being executed [34], even from a potentially malicious OS/Hypervisor.
To be more specific, SGX reserves a space in memory called PRM (Processor
Reserved Memory). The PRM contains an EPC (Enclave Page Cache). The EPC
contains memory for all enclaves and consist of 4KB pages that store the enclaves
data and code, with the maximum of 128MB (32768 pages). The EPC is always
encrypted.
The CPU then protects this part of the memory from all non-enclaved attempts to
access the memory blocks, this including the kernel, hypervisors and SMM accesses.
The initial code and data is uploaded by an the untrusted system software, relying
in software attestation, so it can be proved that it is the user that is communicating
and the the user is interacting with the right enclave. The communication is proofed
by a cryptographic signature that certifies the hash of the secure container contents
matches with the ones of the expected. After this, the CPU uploads the unprotected
memory to EPC pages and commits them to the enclave area. The CPU now marks
the enclave to initialized and its contents are hashed. Operations on the enclave part
can only undergo under specific CPU call instructions. After all the computation is
done, the CPU hashes the results and returns it to the system software.
With Intel SGX version 2 it will be added the ability to dynamically add pages
and threads to a running enclave and the feature to increase the enclave’s heap
during runtime [12].
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2.1.3.3 ARM TrustZone
ARM’s Trustzone approach to secure computing is to separate secure and non-secure
hardware, so that it can stop non-secure software from accessing secure resources
directly. For the processor there are 2 types of software: secure and non-secure. It
separates the two by having a System-on-Chip (SoC) that virtualizes 2 different
CPU’s. This way the important assets can be protected from adversary attacks such
as software attacks and common hardware attacks [33].
This technology can be implemented in ARM Cortex-A, Cortex-M23 and Cortex-
M33 based systems. An overview of the ARM TrustZone can be seen in Figure 2.5,
where there 2 are distinct hardware CPU virtualizations, one is non-trusted and the
other trusted.
TrustedNon-Trusted
Software
Data
Hardware
Software
Data
Hardware
Debug
Figure 2.5: Overview of ARM Trustzone [33]
2.2 Searchable Encryption
Searchable Encryption allows the user to outsource a collection of encrypted data on
a remote server in a private manner, while still maintaining the ability to make key-
words searches over it. These search functionalities are supported without decrypting
the data, with the smallest possible loss of confidentiality.
More specifically, Searchable Encryption allows a user to create a search token
from the keywords that he wants to search for, in a way that given the token, the
server can retrieve the encrypted contents relevant to those keywords. The search
token represents the encrypted query and can only be generated by the users with
the appropriate secret key [22].
Nonetheless, it includes some type of Deterministic Encryption as the use of
deterministic primitives. A disadvantage of this method is the leakage of search and
access patterns when some operations are made that adversaries can recognize. For
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this reason the security of query keywords and search results should be guaranteed
[41].
Searchable Encryption includes 4 parties: the data owner, the semi-trusted server,
a collection of users that will read the data and the key generator.
• The Data Owner - The data owner outsources all of his data together with
appropriate keywords. The user is responsible for encrypting the data with a
particular cryptographic scheme like creating an index that enables searching
over his encrypted data, see figure 2.6.
• The Cloud Server - It’s used to outsource the encrypted data. Upon receiving
a trapdoor from a user with keywords, the server searches over the encrypted
data using the Index created by the data owner. After finishing the search for
the relevant content, the server returns it in an encrypted form.
• The Data User - The data user that wants to send a query to the server, so he
gathers his secret key and creates an encrypted trapdoor containing his query
keywords and sends the trapdoor to the server. After completed, the server
sends the encrypted results to the user, see figure 2.6. This user can be the
same as the data owner.
• Key Generator scheme - This party is considered trusted and is responsible
for the generation and management of secret keys, like the encryption and
decryption keys [46] [56]. In some application, this part can be considered to
be the data owner.
In Figure 2.6 we show the execution of an upload operation, where the user builds
an index I, based on the Database DB and the collection of Messages W, and sends
to the Server the index I and the collection of the encrypted messages, from M1
to Mn. To make a query operation, the user creates a Trapdoor T, containing his
secret key and the keywords f, and sends to the server the Trapdoor T. The server
then searches over with the index I and the trapdoor T, the relevant messages M
and returns them to the user.
There are two main types of Searchable Encryption, those types are Symmetric
Searchable Encryption (SSE) and Public-Key Searchable Encryption (PKAS). In
the following section we are only going to present Searchable Symmetric Encryption.
2.2.1 Searchable Symmetric Encryption
Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) is one of the two main types of Searchable
Encryption, with the other being Public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS).
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Figure 2.6: Upload and Query scheme in Searchable Encryption [22]
As the name suggests Searchable Symmetric Encryption is associated to symmetric
key primitives, as it allows only the private key holder to upload encrypted data
and to create trapdoors for queries. On the contrary, Public key encryption with
keyword search, is associated to public key primitives. It enables all the users who
have the public key to upload encrypted data but only allows the private key holder
to create trapdoors for queries [56]. For these disputed reasons SSE is considered
more efficient than PEKS [13].
In Figure 2.7 [46] we can see the system model of a Searchable Symmetric
Encryption Scheme. The user encrypts a set of data and creates an encrypted index
file witch contains a set of encrypted keywords, extracted from the data. The user
outsources the index and the encrypted data to the server. During a search the user
creates the encrypted query and sends the query to the server. The Cloud server
takes this information and retrieves pointers to the document that contain the search
keywords in the query and returns it to the client [16].
2.2.1.1 SSE Schemes
In this subsection we are going to present a number of SSE Schemes.
• Song
This scheme was the first Searchable Symmetric Encryption scheme [50], and
it was presented in the year 2000. It consists in encrypting the document’s
keyword and XORing the encryption with a HMAC of a random generated
value. This scheme didn’t contain an index, so for searching for a query keyword
consisted on verifying the HMAC signatures, meaning that this method consists
on having linear search complexity for the total number of the query’s keywords
[15].
• Goh
Goh’s implementation of a SSE scheme [19] consists of having an index for
every document, as it was the first scheme containing one. This results on every
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Figure 2.7: System Model of a SSE scheme [46]
time a query is made the server has to search every index for the keywords
present in the query, and the amount of computation work that has to be done
for a query is proportional to the number of documents in the collection.
• Oblivious RAMs
With Oblivious RAMs, SSE can be fully achieved. Using this technique any
type of search query can be done, including disjunctions and conjunctions
of words, without showing its access patterns, that means the information is
not leaked to the server. But there’s a main disadvantage in this method,
as it requires multiple rounds for write and read operations and there is a
logarithmic cost in the average operation. O. Goldreich and R. Ostrovsky
wrote on [20] and a two round solution to this problem, but causing an extreme
large square root overhead in the process.
• SSE-1
SSE-1 was presented in [13] and is called a non-adaptively secure construction.
Like most SSE schemes all the documents are encrypted and an index I is built
during the process of setup.
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The index I consists of two different data structures, an array A that for all
the distinct words in all the documents, contains a stored encryption of the
documents, and a look-up table T, that for all the distinct words in all the
documents, contains the information to locate and decrypt the appropriate
elements inside data structure A. Despite the efficiency of this algorithm,
SSE-1 is not considered secured to adaptive adversaries.
• SSE-2
SSE-2, on the contrary of SSE-1, can achieve security against adaptive adver-
saries, although trading security for performance, as this scheme takes more
space to perform a query and size in the server to store data. However, the
computation costs for SSE-2 are the same as in SSE-1.
SSE-2 is constructed similar to SSE-1, but instead a index I is constructed
using the pair values with <Key, Value>, where key is a distinct word from the
all the words in all the documents and the value is a pointer to the document
where that word appears. Given a word W, that word must be concatenated
with a integer J that represent how many times that word has appeared in
the set of documents until that point, for example, if the word coin appears 3
times in the set of documents, we are going to have a set of pairs in the Index
like <coin1, address1>, <coin2, address2> and <coin3, address3>.
It’s stated in [13] that this method of Indexing will allow the simulator to
construct an index for the adversary that is indistinguishable from a real index,
therefore, secure to adaptability from the adversary.
• Cash
Cash’s implementation of a SSE scheme [9] consists in having a Dynamic
Searchable Encryption in Very-Large Databases, where the entries scale to
millions of records. It is the fastest of presented schemes if there are a large
amount of entries stored in the system. It subsists in associating with each
record/keyword a pseudorandom label, and then for each pair storing the
encrypted record identifier with that label in a non secure dictionary. The
labels are then derived, so when the user makes a keyword query, the client
computes some keyword specific short key that allows the server to search by
computing the label, and then retrieve the identifiers from the dictionary, and
also retrieves the encrypted matching record identifiers. A disadvantage of this
method is that the size of the dictionary is compromised to the server, so it
can know the number of records, keywords and pairs in the data.
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The labels are derived so that the client, on the user inputting the keywords
to a query, can compute a keyword-specific short key, allowing the server to
search by first recomputing the labels, then retrieving the encrypted identifiers
from the dictionary, and finally decrypting the matching encrypted record
identifiers.
Table 2.1: Different SSE Schemes [46] [13]
Scheme Time Complexity Index Size Server Storage #Rounds
Song [50] O(n) N/A O(n) 1
Goh [19] O(n) O(n) O(n) 1
Oblivious RAMs [20] O(log3(n)) N/A O(n ∗ log2(n)) O(log(n))
SSE-1 [13] O(r) O(m+n) O(n) 1
SSE-2 [13] O(r) O(m ∗n) O(n) 1
Cash [9] O(r/p) O(n) O(n) 1
In table 2.1 we show several computations costs of five different SSE schemes. The
letter n denotes the size of the documents set, the letter r denotes the number of
documents, the letter p denotes the number of processors and the letter m denotes
the size of the keywords. To make the comparison easier and more fair we assume
each document has the same size.
2.2.2 Range Queries
The result of a range query operation is all the documents between between a certain
range in a database. Using an ordinary Searchable Encryption if we’d like all the
results on the interval of [a,b], the user would have to make b - a + 1 operations,
causing it to be a very inefficient and insecure method [26].
In [48] it’s built a Multi-dimensional range query over encrypted data, where
it was adapted a tree structure and developed a multi-dimensional range query
system, which included working with an authority holding a master key that can
issue searches to an authorized party, allowing it to decrypt data entries whose
attributes fall within specific ranges, while still preserving privacy of other data
entries.
In [6] it was presented a solution which involved bilinear maps defined over elliptic
curves, permitting Conjunctive, Subset, and Range Queries on Encrypted Data, but
still depending on a public key scheme technique.
In [26] a method was presented which consisted in utilizing only symmetric key
encryption systems, with the search time depending with the number of documents
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corresponding to the retrieved documents corresponding to the keywords, and not
the entire database. This method involved doing the search query on a linked chain
structure, and not in a tree structure. For every entry it is created an external link
containing the following node. This way when the user creates a trapdoor for a
query in the interval [a,b] it must contain the decryption key for the chain a and the
decryption key for chain b By searching two linked chains and all documents related
to the interval [a,b] are searched.
2.3 Password Databases
Password Databases are storage engines where the user’s credential, including the
username and its password are stored. Some examples of how the passwords are
stored in modern days system include Plain Text Passwords, Basic Password Hashing,
Slow Hashes, Encrypted Passwords and Encrypted Passwords with a Dash of Salt.
This section is divided in two subsections, the first one focuses on how passwords
can be stored in a database, stating how each process works and its advantages and
disadvantages. In the second subsection we focus on attacks made by an adversary
on these password databases.
2.3.1 Password Database Storage in The Industry
Information in password databases should be considered more sensitive, because it
contains all the information necessary for an adversary to enter with users stolen pass-
word credentials. Most people recycle passwords between websites, so the adversary
can easily enter any website with the stolen password.
2.3.1.1 Plain Text Passwords
Plain Text Passwords is the most simple way to store a password and also the most
unsafe. The password is stored as it is, and everyone taking a quick glance at the
database can see it. This is a very bad idea for companies to store a password, as the
password can be checked by an employee, social engineering methods, a backdoor
created by a missing Operating System patch or a virus... Hackers can use a simple
SQL Injection method to see everyone passwords. This is the equivalent of someone
breaking into one’s house and finding the key for the safe just on top of it.
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2.3.1.2 Password Hashing
Password Hashing consists of generating a String of characters from a given password.
The generated String is of a fixed length and based on the possible variations from
the inputted password. The algorithms that use hashing are one way functions and
are made in a manner that is impossible to obtain the original password. Some
examples of algorithms that use Basic Password Hashing are:
• MD5
Originally designed to be a hash function, MD5 has been proven to be a not
so secure method of doing so after some vulnerabilities about it being exposed.
It is nowadays more often used has a checksum to check data validity and
integrity [55] .
• SHA-3
SHA-3 refers to Secure Hash Algorithm 3 is the latest iteration of the former
SHA-0, SHA-1 and SHA-2. It was published in just August of 2015 and is
based on the KECCAK algorithm [14]. It consists of a set of hash functions
and it can only be implemented in a 64-bit processor. It has been proven that
it is more secure then its predecessor(SHA-2), but it takes as twice as much
time.
In figure 2.8 we see an illustration of hashing a password. Once the password is
hashed there’s no way to get the password back.
Figure 2.8: Hashing the Password ’abc12345’
2.3.1.3 Password Hashing with salt
Password Hashing with Salt refers to not just hashing the password, but hashing it
with the combination of the password + salt. A salt is randomized hash, and it is
appended to the password in the beginning of it or the end [14]. This way lookup
table and rainbow table attacks will not work, as those tables are only successful if
the hashed passwords are the same. We can see an example of password hashing
with salt below:
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MD5Hash(’abc123’) = a90acb735b18a3314f2db44104bea194
MD5Hash(’abc123’ + ’9oGQSS1cTd’) = 2e8cfc279e0f90e392d0068af2a01f6f
MD5Hash(’abc123’ + ’K89xywW5PE’) = 3a6f3a484e0d39f09760ef03cd70bf2d
The salt used shouldn’t be the same for each hash, as the adversaries can still
run a dictionary attack to discover the sites ’secret’ salt. Instead a salt should be
generated every time a new password is inserted into storage. Also, the salt shouldn’t
be short in terms of length, as it can be easily discovered by adversaries using a
lookup table.
• Bcrypt
Bcrypt is a password hashing scheme [35], based on the Blowfish block cipher,
that makes use of the salt, making it very useful against rainbow table attacks.
Bcrypt takes as input the cost, the salt and the password to be hashed. The
input cost determines how expensive this function is going to be, as this is an
adaptive function, the number of iterations in bcrypt are directly related to the
value of the input cost, making the algorithm slower for every new iteration,
although, theoretically meaning the final hash will become more secure. The
more processing power this algorithm takes to hash, the more secure it will be.
This algorithm is considered future-proof, because as the processors become
more powerful and cheap over time, brute force attacks will become easier, but
so will the bcrypt become more secure as its security depends on the processing
power involved in the process of hashing. For every iteration of this algorithm
the generated key gets expanded, with the use of the original password and the
original salt, making it more difficult to crack, like this. The returned result
of this algorithm is a bcrypt hash [35].
2.3.1.4 Encrypted Passwords
Encryption of passwords is the process of transforming the password to a series of
characters, that are unreadable to the human eye. As already stated in this work,
symmetric encryption allows a party with access to the key to decrypt the encrypted
to obtain the original password. Some examples of some algorithms that use Basic
Password Encryption are:
• RSA
RSA refers to Rivest–Shamir–Adleman and is on the first forms of public-key
encryption and the standard for transmitting information over the web. This
method is relatively slow, so it just usually passes the public encryption key
around, so the encryption/decryption operations can be executed faster at a
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much higher speed[45]. As there is no random factor in the process of the RSA
algorithm, it is fully deterministic, meaning if an adversary knows the linear
relation from the plaintext to the cypertext, can easily crack it [11].
• AES
AES refers to Advanced Encryption Standard and is a symmetric key algo-
rithm used the by USA government to cypher encrypt any sensible data and
information. This method has been proven over the time to not be so secure, as
various methods have been proofed to break the AES algorithm, more notably,
brute force methods [4]. The AES algorithm is considered of very high speed
as it doesn’t use a lot of computer resources as RAM and CPU, as it only
requires 16 cycles per byte of encrypted data [7].
• PBKDF2
PBKDF2 refers to Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 and applies a
pseudo-random function to derive keys. This derived key has no limits in terms
of length, although it can be limited to the size of the structure of the pseudo-
random function. It is remarkable how hard it is to brute force this algorithm,
due to its huge number of layers of encryption (minimum recommended is
4096). The PBKDF2 method takes as input the password, a salt, the number
of layers and the desired length of th e resulting key, it outputs the ciphered
text. Although it is considered very hard to brute force, it is mentioned that
this method is very slow [39].
abc12345 abc12345
Encrypted 
Text
Public Key Private Key
Figure 2.9: Encryption and Decryption of the Password ’abc12345’
In figure 2.9 we see an illustration of encrypting a password. A public key is
requires to encrypt the text and the private key is necessary to decrypt it.
2.3.1.5 Encryption vs Hashing
Encryption and Hashing are the main ways of storing passwords in a database,
and both operate on the original plaintext password. The main difference between
them is that in hashing once you hash a password there’s no way to get back to
the original plaintext, on the opposite, encrypting a password permits getting the
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original password as long as the private key is given. It’s disputed that the best way
to store a password is to hash it, because, supposedly, the hashed password can’t
be hashed back, although this can be avoided by adversaries with a dictionary or a
rainbow attack. On the other hand if the adversary gains access to the private key,
he can decrypt the ciphertext and gain access to all the plaintext passwords.
2.3.2 Attacks on Password Databases
According to a recent study made in the research work [38] this is how the attacks
on main websites were made:
1. In the largest percentage of cases ( 35.3%), the entity that was victim of the
security breach chose not to disclose the attack mechanism.
2. SQL injection — accounts for 29.4% of the attacks, the most prevalent mech-
anism for disclosed attacks.
3. Account hijacking — ( 14.7%), wherein access was obtained via stolen account
credentials, is the second most prevalent attack methodology.
4. Spear-phishing and 3rd party software flaws — were tied at 5.9% each
There’s close to nothing we can do about Account Hijacking and Spear-Pishing,
the only way to efficiently solve this problem is to force a two-way step login verifi-
cation. In this situation the users logins using the knowledge factor, something the
user knows like his password, and a possession factor, something only the user has,
like his mobile phone, per example, if the user wishes to login in a website he has
to insert his password, and then use some form of interaction with his phone, like
inputting a generated code.
In the case of SQL Injection, or other methods that an adversary takes a snapshot
of the database storage, the data comes in plaintext, hashed or encrypted. If the
data is in plaintext, the adversary can already see the data he wishes and sensitive
information is already considered compromised. If it is the hashed, the adversary
has to hash it back to get the original text and if it is encrypted only with the key
can he decypher the ciphertext back to its original plaintext.
In this section we are going to present the most common and efficient methods of
attacking private information, used by an adversary.
2.3.2.1 Brute force Attack
A brute force attack, also referred as Exhaustive Key Search, consists of an adversary
trying to find a password or pass-phrase by trying every single possible combination
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of characters available. This method may be efficient against short passwords, but
not long passwords, as the possible password combination will be much larger [28].
As we can see in Table 2.2 there are 97 possible combinations (26 + 26 + 10 + 35)
for a digit to make up a password character.
A 3 digit password would take at worst 973 (912 673) attempts for an adversary to
guess the password by using brute force, with the current CPU and GPU available
in the market it is cheap and easy to brute force a password with only 3 digits.
Currently, the standard minimum size for a password is 8 digits and that would
take 978 (7 837 433 594 376 961) attempts at worst, it is not a viable option for an
adversary to brute force its way with so many possible combinations.
Table 2.2: Possible digits that make up a password character.
Type Digits Number
Lowercase letters ’a’ to ’z’ 26
Uppercase letters ’A’ to ’Z’ 26
Numbers 0-9 10
Special Characters "^!’#$%&’()*+,-./:;<=>?@_´‘{|}«»~ 35
Total 97
2.3.2.2 Dictionary attack
A Dictionary Attack is very similar to a Brute Force Attack, but instead of trying
to force its way with every possible combination, it uses a technique, that only tries
words contained in a dictionary. The dictionary is created by an adversary, and
it contains all the most likely words to be contained inside a password, therefore
reducing the number of attempts on cracking a password. In every attempt, if a
word from the dictionary fail, the algorithm tries another word. The appending of
a salt in the hash of passwords, or even on the plaintext ones, can totally render
the use of a Dictionary attack useless [10], as the salt appends a random string of
characters to the passwords that most likely won’t exist in the dictionary.
The dictionary can contain real plaintext words or hashed text from the real
plaintext words. More advanced dictionary attacks can also attempt to use common
special characters, numbers, words and a mixing combination of all of them.
The adversary can use the most relevant keywords available on the user’s profile
on an attempt to fill the dictionary in a more efficient way. The user can also avoid
an dictionary attack by misspelling words on his password, to words that are less
probable to don’t exist in the dictionary created by the adversary.
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2.3.2.3 Birthday Attack
The Birthday Attack uses the same approach as the Birthday Problem from Proba-
bilistic Theory. The Birthday Problem consists on having a population of n random
people, and considering some pair of two of those n people will share the same
birthday [58].
Using the same logic an adversary, that has gained information about one pass-
word, can try to guess that there are at least two passwords equal to one another in
the database storage, given that are enough stored passwords.
2.3.2.4 Rainbow table
Considered to be the most efficient way of cracking a password, a Rainbow Table
consists on an adversary building a pre-computed table with the same hash algorithm
of the hashed password its trying to crack, and a reduction algorithm that’s used to
reverse a password hash to a plaintext. The chains which make up rainbow tables
are of a hash and reduction functions starting at a certain plaintext, and ending at
a certain hash. The Rainbow table algorithm starts with a hash and works like this
[23]:
1. If the Hash you have is the same as one in the list of final Hashes, go to step 5.
2. Insert the Hash in the list of final Hashes
3. Reduce the hash to another plaintext
4. Hash the reduced plaintext
5. If the hash obtained is the same as the original hash, the intended plaintext is
discovered. If not, choose a random plaintext, hash it and go to step 1
This method also takes a long time to run from scratch, but with the difference
that the adversary doesn’t have to start from zero every time he wants to crack a
hashed password, and it can index and search the previously completed hash results
[54].
A Rainbow Table does a space-memory trade-off, which means, it trades the long
computing time to discover a password, for memory, meaning the longer the method
runs, the more disk space will occupate in the hard drive or RAM. A Rainbow
Table size will vary, from 52 GB up to 864 GB,[32] although on the long run it will
probably take much less time to be successfully for the adversary, than a Dictionary
Attack or a Brute Force Attack [27].
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2.3.3 Mitigating Attacks on Password Databases
2.3.3.1 Password Reuse
In [25] it’s stated that most password theft happens because of the Domino Affect
on Password Reuse, meaning that the users use the same 4 or 5 password for every
website. The problem with this is that if an adversary gains access to a password
database of just one website, that could lead to failure on other systems.
One way to prevent attacks is when the system detects an adversary repeatedly
attempting to use incorrect password to access one’s account, the system would shut
down in defence.
The paper also mentions public-key encryption (PKE), Public-key infrastructure
(PKI) and Biometrics to serve as the authentication process, instead of the usual
user-password combination.
Biometrics involve some form of data obtained from ther user’s body such as,
the iris of his eyes, the fingertip, the whole face, or some patterns in the user’s voice.
While convenient, unlike a password, once compromised the biometric authentication
can’t be changed.
2.3.3.2 Password Managers
Password Managers helps users manage multiples password accounts by turning a
single memorized password into a different password for every of is accounts. Typical
password managers are integrated to web browsers. When the password managers
detects that the user has return to a site for which he has a stored password, it
fills the login form with the appropriate username and password. Most password
managers do a trade off in their design, trading the process of logging in more
conveniently, reducing the user’s memory burden for every website, but introduces
an external dependency [57].
Some usability goals should be guaranteed in password managers like, let the
user only have to remember one password, allow the user to change said password
and security goals like, the use of an unique password for each site, resist offline
attacks and automatically detect pishing sites. This should relief the user of having
to create and to memorize a new password for every website that the user is signed
up to.
Although the advancements on password managers over the years some studies
made recently like in [31] showed some critical vulnerabilities, and even stating how
the attackers could steal arbitrary credentials of the user from the most popular
password managers around the world.
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2.3.3.3 Reverse Turing Tests
Reverse Turing Tests, also referred as just RTT, and better known by some people
for the name CAPTCHAs, are a series of tests that distinguish between a computer
program and a human. These RTT should be easy for the real user to solve, hard
for automated programs to resolve and have a very low probability of guessing the
answers correctly [43]. This is useful because it can limit the number of automated
attacks on a database password, so a real human has to pass the test every time he
wants to try a user password combination. Some examples of RTT could be asking
the user to input the words contained in a picture, a math operation, picking some
images, etc...
In figure 2.10 we can see two examples of RTT. In the first one the user is
required to select all the images containing a bus, and in the second example the
user is required to type the words in that picture.
Figure 2.10: Example 1 [1] and Example 2 [2] of Reverse Turing Tests
2.3.4 Scientific Solutions to Secure Password Databases
2.3.4.1 PolyPasswordHasher
PolyPasswordHasher is a software password storage mechanism deployed on the
the server side. The technique used prevents the adversaries to crack an individual
password, because PolyPasswordHasher uses cryptographic hashing and threshold
cryptography to combine password hash data with shares so that users unknowingly
protect each other’s password data [8]. With the amount of increased work on the
server by a magnitude order, the adversary needs more time to crack a password.
Basically this scheme additionally protects hash password with salt with an
additional secret shared used with the Shamir’s Secret Sharing method [47]. The
secret shares are stored in memory and are used to verify the hashed passwords,
although it’s guaranteed that an adversary can only read what’s on is persisted
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on disk, including the password database, but can’t read from the memory. A
disadvantage of this, is that if an adversary gains a access to a single space of
memory it can steal the secret share.
2.3.4.2 ErsatzPasswords
In [3] a scheme is presented similar to traditional password database schemes, when
an adversary tries to access the database, the only passwords that he will get, will
be fake passwords, regarded in this paper as ErsatzPasswords. Then, once the
adversary tries to use these fake passwords to authenticate to a user’s account, the
system detects it and raises an alarm. The fake passwords should maintain the same
format and appearance of typical passwords to succeed in the process of deception
on the adversary. The authors of the paper claim it is impossible for an attacker
to recover user passwords from the hashed format, without physical access to the
systems database where the passwords are stored.
2.3.4.3 SafeKeeper
In [29] a new scheme called SafeKeeper, is presented thats ensure secrecy of passwords
in web authentication systems. This scheme assures that the users credential are
secure ever since the user inputs his credentials on to the web browser. SafeKeeper
ensures this by requiring the installation of a addon on to the users browser and makes
the communication to the server (where the password database is) in secure channels.
Inside the server it computes a CMAC (cipher-based message authentication code)
on the password before they are stored in the database. It uses Intel SGX, generating
and storing the cryptographic key inside an Enclave created by SGX, and also makes
the cryptographic operations inside the enclave. Inside the Enclave some other
properties are stored, like how many attempts has that particular user used, before
successfully entering the right credentials.
2.4 Summary of the Related Work
As seen in the previous sections of this chapter, the outsourcing of data to an un-
trusted hardware server poses great danger to the user because of the unknown
parties responsible for maintaining them. Methods like Searchable Symmetric En-
cryption have proven to be an efficient way to make searches over encrypted data
showing potential for securing password databases, but despite this operations can
still leak patterns that adversaries can exploit. Oblivious RAMs avoids this problem
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with a dynamic solution, frequently switching the position of indexes, and although
it is considered a secure method it comes with the great cost in efficiency.
Recent technologies, like Intel SGX, allow creating trusted execution environ-
ments where computations can be performed in isolation from other (possibly priv-
iliged) processes, although there is little work done in password database management
on this technology.
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Designed Solutions
In this chapter we present the details of our new solution for password database
management. We start by presenting our system and adversary models. Then we
present two schemes: one based solely on cryptographic techniques and one that
additionally uses trusted hardware.
3.1 Architecture
Traditional password database systems work with a key-value approach. When
the user provides the login information, the system searches for the username and
checks if the password (or hash of the password) matches. In this approach the
login information can be stored in a variety of data structures, like SQL-Table or an
Hash-Map.
3.1.1 System Model
In this work we propose a new model for secure password database management,
based on cryptographic primitives. In our model a simple API is provided for
password management. This API can be applied in a non-trustable cloud infra-
structure, without interfering with the security premises of our scheme. The proposed
system model considers several writers and readers, referred as Users, which uses
the password database stored in the Cloud Server, through a Web Application,
assuming that all the data is sent with a secure TLS connection.
In Figure 3.1 we show a high level view of the proposed system. The user sends
his credentials through a WEB Application, which id redirected to the database
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Server
Intel SGX
Password 
DatabaseTPM
User 1
User 2
User 3
Web Application
Figure 3.1: System Model
server. The server saves the database of passwords in persistent storage, and can
optionally use trustable hardware modules(i.e. TPM and Intel SGX) to perform
cryptographic operations in isolation and securely store the respective cryptographic
keys.
To interact with our system, we resort to the previously mentioned API. The
API is composed of database operations as shown below:
• Register (String username, String password)
• Login (String username, String password)
• ChangePassword (String username, String oldPassword, String newPassword)
• ChangeUsername (String oldUsername, String password, String newUsername)
• DeleteUser (String username, String password)
The server sends a boolean answer to the user indicating whether or not the
authentication process was successful. The WEB Application can use this variable
to transform it into an access token so the users can authenticate more easily.
The main objective of this model is to secure password databases without sacrific-
ing performance, on the most common operations of password database systems. In
Figure 3.2 it is demonstrated a more detailed vision of what happens in our system
when the user makes a login operation and the interaction that is made with the
password database, represented as an encrypted data structure.
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Client
Response
Login(username, password)
Figure 3.2: Top level view of the execution of a Login operation and interaction with
a password database
3.1.2 Adversary Model
In this thesis we aim to protect the user’s passwords from passive attacks. The
main adversary we consider, is a snapshot adversary, that obtains a complete copy
of the password database, even if he only has a very small time frame of access to
the database. This adversary usually corresponds to the Internet hacker, trying to
find vulnerabilities in the cloud infrastructure. We also consider as an adversary
a cloud administrator that is trustable, but also curious, i.e. that operates in the
cloud infra-structure and its servers. The basic principle of our scheme is to ensure
that even when adversaries gain access to protected passwords, they can not attack
(e.g. brute force, dictionary attack, rainbow table) and decipher those passwords,
without the corresponding cryptographic key.
A problem with the commonly used hashing password schemes (like B-Crypt,
SHA-3, etc..), is that when there is a database password leak, a big list of usernames
and their passwords are published online and most of the times the username of the
user is their e-mail. An adversary can decide to target a password hash of a known
username, and it can know the username of the target just by knowing the user’s
email. After the adversary has gained access to the targeted users password hash,
it is just a matter of time before the hash of the password can be reverted to the
original text. Nowadays it can take months to get the original password from its
hashed value, but with the rising increase of processor performance it is also a matter
of time for more powerful and cost-efficiency processors to be available to the public
market. Once the adversary gains access to the targeted users original decrypted
password text, and the adversary usually has access to all the online information
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of where that user is registered, because most people use the same password for all
their accounts [52].
3.2 Design of SSPM
In this section we explain the design of SSPM (Simple Secure Password Manage-
ment).
SSPM receives the username and the password of the user (i.e. through secure
TLS channels). The system takes the result of the concatenation of the username
and its password, and hashes with a secret key using a HMAC-SHA1 algorithm,
then storing the result of it in an Hash-Set. With this method it is very difficult
to target a certain user, even if the adversary has made a snapshot copy of the
password database, it is almost impossible to guess what hash corresponds to each
user. Additionally, the HMAC function will act as an encryption operation, being
more secure than a hash + salt scheme, which can be attacked through advanced
rainbow table techniques. In Figure 3.2, we show a top level view of how SSPM
stores the users credentials in n hash set.
In Figure 3.3 we demonstrate how the values are stored in a plaintext form and
how it is stored in our system. If an adversary has a snapshot copy of the database
it can easily try to gain knowledge about a known users password by searching its
user name in the data structure and attacking the password. In our system the
adversary has no idea where to attack the targeted user, because just by having the
database, the adversary has no idea where the username information is stored.
Problems with this approach
A problem with this approach, is that two different users can have the same
concatenation of their username and password combination. The probability of that
happening is very small, but it can happen. For example, if user 1 has the username
’Michael’ and the password ’123456’, and user 2 has the username ’Michael1’ and
the password ’23456’, the resulting concatenation of the two combinations would be
’Michael123456’, and the result of the HMAC-SHA1 algorithm would be the same,
even if the usernames are unique.
To solve this problem we have come with the solution of inputing a fixed salt
value to work as a separator for the username and the password. For example,
if we have the salt ’$2a$10$’ the result of the concatenation of user 1 would be
’Michael$2a$10$123456’ and user 2 would be ’Michael1$2a$10$23456’, therefore re-
sulting in a different output by the encryption HMAC-sha1 algorithm.
Algorithms 1 and 2 represent in detail the most simple SSPM operations. In the
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Figure 3.3: Small sample size of the stored login information in the new system
algorithms, the index Users works like a encrypted data structure. The deterministic
encryption algorithm that we use is HMAC-SHA1 (because we don’t need to decipher
the values). To guarantee that this index never possesses the two equal entries, we
define that each entry saves the result of the concatenation of the users username
and respective password (with a random set of characters in the middle). Using this
method, even if two different users have the same password, their entries will be
distinct, because their username must be unique.
Additionally, to guarantee that there are no users with the same username, we
use another ciphered data structure that only saves the usernames registered in
the system (referred as Usernames in the algorithms 1 and 2). It is possible to
simplify these data structures in just one, in which the key of the data structure
would be the username and the value would be the password, although the proposed
separation of the data structures, allows to make login operations faster (sacrificing
some performance in operations like Register).
There is always the possibility of the adversary studying the access pattern of a
users login. A hash set works like a hash table (or a hash map), when inserting is
concerned. A hash function is used to compute an index into an array of buckets or
slots, and this hash function decides this index by taking the characters of the given
string (already hashed) and its size, thereby, the index of the users data in the hash
set stays the same. An adversary can take advantage of this by studying the access
patterns of a user.
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To avoid what was above stated, in our system we periodically change the HMAC-
SHA1 cryptographic key that we make use of. We do this by saving the users
username and password in an has map, and encrypt it using AES with a key with
the length of 256 bits. Then, we decrypt the AES hash map and we generate a new
HMAC-SHA1 key. After that we make a new hash for each user using HMAC-SHA1
with the new key, we create a new hash set containing the new users concatenation
hash of its username and password, and we replace this hash-set with the old one.
By doing this, we guarantee that an adversary can’t explore the access patterns of
a users activity so frequently.
A problem with this approach, is that it leaves the data exposed temporarily
when the data in the hash map encrypted in AES is decrypted, leaving the users
credentials in plaintext inside the main memory for several moments. For this reason
we leave this approach as a setting for the administrator of the password database
to choose if he so desires. This was the reason we thought of working with Intel
SGXs Enclave, and we explain in the next subsection 3.3.2 how we solved this issue.
Here, we detail the operations of our API:
• Login (String username, String password) Every time SSPM receives an opera-
tion, it also receives two or three String arguments, depending on what type of
operation it was requested. For the login operation we receive two arguments,
the username and its password. We gather the received username and password
from the client, apply a concatenation that consists of the username + a fixed
salt + password and apply the HMAC-SHA1 function with a designated key.
Then the scheme verifies if the resulting hash is contained inside the Users
hash set. The scheme then sends the boolean result of this verification.
• Register(String username, String password) The scheme first hashes the user-
name and checks if it exists in the Usernames hash set. We can’t have two
users with the same username, so if the hashed username already exists in
this hash set the register operation is canceled. The scheme also applies the
HMAC-SHA1 function to the result of the concatenation between the user-
names, the fixed salt and the password. Then we insert the resulting hash to
the Users hash set, and send a confirmation that the register operation was
successful.
• ChangePassword (String username, String oldPassword, String newPassword)
The scheme hashes the concatenation of the username and the oldPassword. If
it exists in the Users hashset, it is removed. Then it is applied the concatenation
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Algorithm 1 SSPM v1
1: Users : HashSet with all the hashes of the concatenations of the usernames and
their passwords
2: Usernames :HashSet with all the hashes of just the usernames
3: sep : Random String to seperate the username of their password, during the
concatenation
4: key : Cryptographic key to be used during the HMAC-SHA1 function call
5: λ : Security parameter
6: procedure SSPMv1 (λ)
7: Usernames←{}
8: Users←{}
9: sep← randomString()
10: key← generateKey(λ)
11: procedure Login (username, password)
12: Client:
13: Response← sspm.Login(Username,Password)
14: if Response == true then return createToken()
15: else return null
16: Server:
17: hashedUser← applyHMAC(key,username+ sep+ password)
18: if hashedUser in Users then return true
19: else return false
20: procedure Register (username, password)
21: Client:
22: return sspm.Register(Username,Password)
23: Server:
24: hashedUsername← applyHMAC(key,username)
25: if hashedUsername in Usernames then
26: return false
27: else
28: Usernames← Users∪hashedUsername
29: hashedUser← applyHMAC(key,username+ sep+ password)
30: Users← Users∪hashedUser
31: return true
32: procedure ChangePassword (username, oldPassword, New-
Password)
33: Client:
34: return sspm.ChangePassword(username,oldPassword,NewPassword)
35: Server:
36: hashedUser← applyHMAC(key,username+ sep+ oldPassword)
37: if hashedUser not in Users then
38: return false
39: else
40: Users← Users \hashedUser
41: newHashedUser← applyHMAC(key,username+sep+newPassword)
42: Users← Users∪newHashedUser
43: return true 39
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Algorithm 2 SSPM v1
1: procedure ChangeUsername (OldUsername, password,
NewUsername)
2: Client:
3: return sspm.ChangeUsername(OldUsername,password,NewUsername)
4: Server:
5: hashedUser← applyHMAC(key,OldUsername+ sep+ password)
6: if hashedUser not in Users then
7: return false
8: else
9: hashedUserName← applyHMAC(key,OldUsername)
10: Usernames← Usernames \hashedUserName
11: Users← Users \hashedUser
12: newHashedUserName← applyHMAC(key,NewUsername)
13: newHashedUser← applyHMAC(key,NewUsername+sep+password)
14: Usernames← Usernames∪newHashedUserName
15: Users← Users∪newHashedUser
16: return true
17: procedure deleteUser (username, password)
18: Client:
19: return sspm.deleteUser(username,password)
20: Server:
21: hashedUser← applyHMAC(key,username+ sep+ password)
22: if hashedUser not in Users then
23: return false
24: else
25: Users← Users \hashedUser
26: hashedUsername← applyHMAC(key,username)
27: Users← Users \hashedUser
28: Usernames← Usernames \hashedUsername
29: return true
of the username and the oldPassword and inserts the resulting hash in the
Users list.
• ChangeUsername (String oldUsername, String password, String newUsername)
The scheme first hashes the resulting concatenation of the oldUsername with
the password. It checks if the resulting hash exists in the Users hash set, and
deletes it if so. It changes the old username with the new username in the
Usernames hash set. Then it inserts the hash of the result of the concatenation
of the newUsername with the password and inserts it into the Users hash set.
• DeleteUser (String username, String password) Same as the Login and Register
operations, the scheme first gathers the received username and password from
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the client, applies a concatenation to them and then checks if its result exists
in the Users hash set, so it can be deleted. The username from the Usernames
hash set is also deleted.
3.2.1 Scheme Versions
In the work done for the scheme presented in this thesis we present several versions
of it. Each new version iteration of the scheme guarantees more security properties
sacrificing performance. Below is a summarize of what each version does and what
it differs from one another:
• SSPM V0
It is the most basic implementation of the new scheme, while we consider it
more secure than ordinary schemes, it has some compromises, like different
Users can have the same username. As long as they do not have the same
password, confidentiality is guaranteed. Data is stored in one data structure
that only remains in memory. Users can have repeated usernames. This version
is theoretically the fastest. All data is stored in memory and persistence in disk
is non existing. It uses HMAC-SHA1 to encrypt the data, using the same fixed
key that is randomly generated when the process of the program is initialized.
As the data is only stored in memory, persistence of the data is non-existing.
• SSPM V1
Same as V0, but with the difference that also has an additional data structure
in memory, that stores all usernames using a simple hash function, just to
make sure that two different users don’t have the same username. A simple
verification is made when a user is trying to register in the system, just to
make sure that username is not already in use. Delete operations and change
username operations have to also include the changes in this new data structure.
Persistence does not exist here also.
Several alternative versions of this scheme, also included in the work done,
consist of using different hashing encryption algorithms. Including HMAC-
sha256, HMAC-md5, sha-224 and sha-3. The last of the two don’t require a
generated key.
Please note, that despite the fact that solely using md5 is not considered a
secure method of hashing anymore (due to easily proven collisions, being easily
generated nowadays), HMAC-md5 is still considered a secure method due to
its generated random key.
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• SSPM V2
In addition to the features of V1, it introduces two new data structures. In
one of them, all the data is stored (using key-> value, for usernames and
passwords) in an encrypted way using AES with a 256 bit key. The other
data structure, called log, that records all operations so that periodically the
ciphered database using AES can be updated. Also, these functionalities are
added:
– Every X seconds (this can be changed as a parameter) the log is read,
so the ciphered database of values can be updated. This requires that
the database is deciphered so it can be updated, leaving it temporarily
exposed, vulnerable to adversary attacks.
– Every Y seconds, a new key is randomly generated to be worked with
the HMAC-sha1 algorithm. All the hashes of the concatenation of the
users and passwords are again generated using the new key with the
HMAC-sha1 algorithm. This step uses the ciphered database to obtain
the original values of the users usernames and passwords, having to also
decipher the database, leaving the users data temporarily exposed.
This version also adds persistence. All the data is stored in disk periodically,
and when the process starts it checks if there is any saved data in disk, so the
process can read it.
• SSPM V3
Same as V2, except every Y seconds, when the data structure (where the
encryption of the concatenation of the usernames and password are stored) is
updated, it randomly selects a different scheme to encrypt the data, using the
different versions of the V1 scheme that include the schemes HMAC-sha256,
HMAC-md5, sha-224 and sha-3. The last of the two do not require a generated
key.
• SSPM V4
This version is similar to V3, but with the difference that all data is periodically
stored in a Redis Database. Persistence is guaranteed in the process.
There is also an alternative version to V4, that stores all data using Redis
instead of storing the data normally in memory. Although there is Persistence
in this method, Performance is affectedly compromised by this.
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• SSPM with different settings By the end of our work, we have made a SSPM
version that includes all the features described in the different version above
and we leave this features as settings that can be left to the administrator to
select which one he desires to work with, when he wants to start the system.
The desired settings can be defined when initializing the scheme, by sending
boolean values as parameters that represent the settings. These settings are:
– usernames - Don’t allow replicate usernames.
– redis - Use a Redis database to achive persistency (a Redis service is
required for this).
– new key - Generate new cryptographic keys periodically.
– tpm key - Use TPM to store the secret cryptographic key to the HMAC
and AES functions (described in detail in Section 3.3.1).
– tpm op - Use TPM for all the hashing operations (may be very slow).
3.2.1.1 Security Analysis of SSPM
Here we make a security analysis of the SSPM scheme without the incorporation of
Trusted Hardware Platforms (that are explained in the next sections).
SSPM keeps two data structures in memory. One, that we refer as Users is
a Hash-Set. If an adversary gains access to this data structure it can see all the
results of the HMAC-SHA1 function, of the concatenation of the username, the
password and a fixed salt. However, even tough HMAC-SHA1 is a deterministic
function, all these entries will be different, as long as there are no repetitions in the
usernames and passwords. Furthermore, all entries will be of equal length (20 bytes
for HMAC-SHA1), independently of the underlying passwords. If the adversary also
gains access to the HMAC-SHA1 key, it can try to find a collision for the password,
so we assume the data in the Users Hash-Set is as secure as a SHA1 algorithm. Even
then, as all information is inside a Hash-Set, the adversary can not know where a
specific users entry is. However, the adversary can study the access patterns of a
specific user, revealing where the entry of that user is.
The other data structure that we keep saved is where the HMAC-SHA1 hash of
the usernames of the users is kept, that we refer as Usernames. This data structure is
only used during the register and delete operations, to make sure that there are not
users with the same username. If the adversary gains access to this data structure
and is able to create collisions, it can only have access to the hash of the usernames
of the users and not the hash of their passwords.
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We keep the cryptographic key for the HMAC-SHA1 in memory. As the data
inside the Users data structure is hashed using an one-way function, the adversary
can potentially revert back the original plain text of users credentials if it gains
access to the secret key.
In later versions of SSPM we use another data structure to prevent the adversary
to study the access patterns of an user. This data structure consists of a Hash-Map,
in which the key is the username and the value is the password, and it is encrypted
in AES (Advanced Encryption Scheme) with a key of 256 bit length. This data
structure is referred as DBPW. Periodically, SSPM decrypts DBPW, generates a
new cryptographic key, and uses the entries in DBPW to create a new Users data
structures. As the key used in the HMAC-SHA1 is different, the hashed entries
inside the Users will have different addresses in memory, and the study of the access
patterns of the Adversary will become difficult. There is a major flaw in this approach,
as if the adversary gains access of DBPW and the AES key, it can easily decrypt
and have the plaintexts of the users. For these reasons, we keep this solution as an
optional setting. This flaw is what inspired us to study and make use of Trusted
Hardware on SSPM.
3.3 Design with Trusted Hardware
In this Section we are going to explain how we used Trusted Hardware for the design
of our thesis. First, we talk about TPM (Trusted Platform Modules) and secondly.
we are going to explain how we incorporated Intel SGX (Intel’s Software Guard
Extensions) in our scheme. Lastly, we are going to make a security analysis of SSPM
with SGX.
3.3.1 SSPM TPM
This version works with the use of TPM (Trusted Platform Module). TPM is
a cryptographic chip installed in the motherboard of the computer. Most modern
computers have an available socket for easy installation of a TPM chip, although this
version first detects if the hosting computer has an existing TPM module installed
in the motherboard, and if not it launches a simulator.
This version is divided into two optional implementations. In one of them all
cryptographic operations are executed inside the TPM, and SSPM connects to the
TPM every time it has to make any kind of cryptographic function. To mention that
all keys are kept inside the TPM. In the another implementation of this version,
when the HMAC-SHA1 key is created, half the key is kept in memory (and stored
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in disk) and the other half is generated and kept inside the TPM. Every time that
SSPM has to make a cryptographic operation it makes a request to the TPM for its
half of the key. The second implementation takes less resources and is faster than
the first implementation.
3.3.2 SSPM SGX
In this version we use the technology created by Intel, named SGX (Software Guard
Extensions) in a new version of SSPM that we call SSPM SGX. We can see a visual
interface of SSPM SGX in Figure 3.4, and we also made a sequence diagram for a
better understanding of how SGX was used in our scheme, available in Figure 3.5,
that displays our scheme SSPM using SGX.
For the SGX implementation of our scheme we do organize the data structures
a little differently than the other versions. The only data structure that is in
unprotected memory is the Users hash set. All hashing and encryption functions are
made inside the Enclave, which is created as we are starting up the process. In this
case the HMAC function key is kept inside the Enclave and never leaves it. Also a
log is kept inside the Enclave, containing the latest modifications to the password
database, so we can periodically update the encrypted map data structure that we
named DBPW. DBPW is encrypted using the CPU unique key, and can only be
decrypted using the same CPU. All calls to SSPM SGX pass through the Enclave.
We work with 2 active threads in this version:
• One of the threads is always listening for operation calls by an outside asset,
like a client. Once it receives an operation request and the respective string
arguments, it sends the arguments to the Enclave where it applies the HMAC
function with the key that is stored and saves the changes to a log. After that
the Enclave returns the string result of the HMAC function to memory and
in memory the User hash set is searched over. After all this has happened the
thread returns a boolean answer.
• The second thread enters an infinite loop and waits X seconds before getting
DBPW from disk and sending it to the Enclave. Inside the Enclave, DBPW
is decrypted, using the processors unique key, and changes that were inserted
in the log are applied to DBPW. A new Users hash set is also created in this
step. Both Users and DBPW (after encryption) data structures are sent to
memory after this. The encrypted DBPW is stored in the disk and the new
Users hash set replaces the existing one.
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In the case the computer that is running SSPM SGX has to restart or turn off,
the program will try to wait for the second thread to initiate its execution before
shutting down, and store DBPW in disk. After a reboot SSPM SGX will try to
read from disk a DBPW data structure, so it can restore all the data structures that
compose SSPM SGX.
In the Algorithms 3 and 4 we can see the pseudo-code that we use for the
application that interacts with the Intel SGX. In the Algorithm 5 we can see the
pseudo-code that shows how the operations inside the Enclave that we designed are
made.
Memory
Enclave
- sha1key (String)
- log ( String array)
Thread #1
DBPW
1. Every X seconds
2. Get DBPW from disk
4. Dec(DBPW) := Dec(DBPW) + log
7. Enc(DBPW) and send it back
3.  Send DBPW
8. Write DBPW to disk
Thread #2
1. Receive Operations and Strings
2. Send it 3. Apply Hmac function with sha1key
- users (String HashSet)
4.  Return the result of the function5. Save the changes and 
return the result to the client
5. Generate a new key
6. Generate a new Users hashset
Figure 3.4: Visual representation of how the SSPM SGX
3.3.2.1 Security Analysis of SSPM SGX
Here we make the security analysis of the SSPM scheme with the incorporation of
our implementation of SGX.
SSPM SGX also keeps the Users and the Usernames data structures in memory, as
we already described in subsection 3.2.1.1. Inside the Enclave created by Intel SGX,
SSPM generates the cryptographic key to be used for the HMAC-SHA1 function. In
this version, all cryptographic functions are made inside the Enclave, as the key never
leaves the Enclave. The program in main memory sends the strings that require to
be hashed (the concatenation of the user and their password) to the Enclave. We
consider the generated cryptographic key to be as secure, as long as the data inside
the Enclave will not be breached.
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Algorithm 3 SSPM SGX - Main Memory
1: Users : HashSet with all the hashes of the concatenations of the usernames and
their passwords
2: Usernames :HashSet with all the hashes of just the usernames
3: λ : Security parameter
4: procedure SSPM_SGX (λ)
5: DBPW ← getDBPWfromDisk()
6: ecall_init(DBPW,length)
7: new Thread(){
8: Sleep(216000) //every hour
9: DBPW ← getDBPWfromDisk()
10: DBPW ← ecallnewHmac(DBPW,length)}
11: procedure Login (username, password)
12: hashedUser← ecall_hmac_this(0,username+ sep+ password, length)
13: if hashedUser in Users then
14: return true
15: else
16: return false
17: procedure Register (username, password)
18: hashedUsername← applyHMAC(key,username)
19: if hashedUsername in Usernames then
20: return false
21: else
22: Usernames← Usernames∪hashedUsername
23: hashedUser← ecall_hmac_this(1,username+ sep+ password, length)
24: Users← Users∪hashedUser
25: return true
26: procedure ChangePassword (username, oldPassword, new-
Password)
27: concatenatedUser← username+ sep+ oldPassword
28: hashedUser← ecall_hmac_this(2,username+ sep+oldPassword, length)
29: if hashedUser not in Users then
30: return false
31: else
32: Users← Users \hashedUser
33: hashedUser ← ecall_hmac_this(2,username + sep +
newPassword, length)
34: Users← Users∪hashedUser
35: return true
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CLIENT MEMORY ENCLAVE
operation(String args)
DISK
boolean result
Loop 1
Wait for operation request
Loop 2
Wait X Seconds
get DBPW
DBPW
DBPW
Dec(DBPW) := Dec(DBPW) + log
Generate new sha1key
create new Users HashSet
Enc(DBPW)
DBPW and new Users
THREAD #2
initiate loop
Save DBPW to disk
-Users (String hashset)
  -DBPW( encrypted      
map)
  -sha1key(String)
  -log( String array)
Send String args to apply HMAC functions
apply HMAC function
save changes to log
send hashed result
save changes to Users
Figure 3.5: Sequence diagram of SSPM SGX
Algorithm 4 SSPM SGX - Main Memory 2
1: procedure ChangeUsername (oldUsername, newUsername,
password)
2: hashedUser← ecall_hmac_this(3,oldUsername+ sep+ password, length)
3: if hashedUser not in Users then return false
4: else
5: Users← Users \hashedUser
6: hashedUser ← ecall_hmac_this(3,newUsername + sep +
password, length)
7: Users← Users∪hashedUser
8: return true
9: procedure deleteUser (username, password)
10: hashedUser← ecall_hmac_this(0,Username+ sep+ password, length)
11: if hashedUser not in Users then return false
12: else
13: Users← Users \hashedUser
14: hashedUsername← applyHMAC(key,username)
15: Users← Users \hashedUser
16: Usernames← Usernames \hashedUsername
17: return true
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Algorithm 5 SSPM SGX - Enclave Operations
1: sep: Random String to seperate the username of their password, during the
concatenation
2: log: Array of Array of String to save the latest changes made to the database
3: hmac_key: Random String key for the HMAC hashing operations
4: procedure ecall_init (DBPW, length)
5: sep← generateRandomString()
6: hmac_key← generateRandomKey()
7: if DBPW != null then
8: newUsers← generateNewUsersHashset(DBPW,hmac_key)
9: return newUsers
10: else
11: return null
12: procedure ecall_hmac_this (code, user, length)
13: log← log ∪ code,user
14: hashedUser← applyHmacFunction(user,hmac_key)
15: return hashedUser
16: procedure ecall_newHMAC (DBPW, length)
17: decDBPW ← decrypt(DBPW )
18: decDBPW ← decDBPW ∪ log
19: for all entry ∈ decDBPW do
20: hashedEntry← applyHmacFunction(entry,hmac_key)
21: Users← Users∪hashedEntry
22: DBPW ← encrypt(decDBPW )
23: return {DBPW,Users}
To obfuscate leaks of access patterns to the adversary, SSPM periodically gener-
ates new Users hashes. To achieve this we use the same approach as in subsection
3.2.1.1, we save every usernames and passwords in plaintext, in an encrypted map.
In this version, we encrypt the hash map with the unique CPU id using Intel SGX.
We refer to this data structure as DBPW. DBPW is kept in disk. Periodically, the
program in main memory gets the DBPW from disk and sends it to the Enclave for
it to decipher, and make a new Users hash-set. This way SSPM doesn’t leak access
patterns to the adversaries and assures the security of the cryptographic keys. If
the adversary gains access to DBPW, it must gain physical access to the CPU to be
able to decipher it.
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Implementation and Evaluation
In this chapter we show in more detail the design and implementation of our scheme
and we also show performance evaluations that we made, comparing it to other
Database Password Schemes.
All the work is currently implemented in JAVA in a Windows environment, except
the implementation with SGX that was made in C and C++, due to the fact that
Intel released the SGX Software Development Kit (SDK) only being available in this
programming language and it’s available in a Linux environment.
4.1 Implementing existing Hashing schemes
To evaluate our scheme in the most accurate way, we imported the most used
password database schemes used nowadays, majorly from open source projects and
other means of literature, like papers. We modified some part of the open source
code so we can best incorporate it in our designed API, always keeping the copyright
left by the original authors.
The following hashing and database schemes are available in our universal API
that we built:
• Diverse traditional hashing schemes :
– Plain Text
Although it is not secure, we considered it for evaluation.
– MD5
It is also not considered secure. For the use of the MD5 function we use
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the Security library included in Java and call the MD5 function from
there.
– SHA-1
Also use the security library included in JAVA.
– SHA-224
Also use the security library included in JAVA.
– SHA-3
To implement SHA-3 we used the open source library available in https:
//www.bouncycastle.org/. We also adapted some of its code that we
used.
– HMAC-SHA1
To implement HMAC-SHA1 (and all other HMAC) algorithms we use the
Javax Crypto libraries.
• B-Crypt
Adapted from the open source repository available online in https://github.
com/jeremyh/jBCrypt.
• PolyPasswordHasher
Adapted from the open source repository available online in https://github.
com/PolyPasswordHasher/PolyPasswordHasher-Java.
All the schemes mentioned above were imported from some already existing
sources and were modified making use of online documentation, literature and online
forums. All of these schemes were modified by us, so they can accommodate the
universal API that was previously mentioned in Subsection 3.1.1.
4.2 Implementation of SSPM
The intuition behind the SSPM is that we can use Searchable Symmetric Encryption
techniques, namely encrypted data structures, in a way that it can support the most
common operation of a database password management scheme with the most viable
security and efficiency. A structure of ciphered data is a structure like a dictionary,
where every entry is encrypted with a deterministic encryption scheme. The use of
deterministic encryption allows to easily make edit and remote queries over the data,
sending to the server a ciphered token with a deterministic encryption scheme.
To compensate the evident security fault introduced by the determinism of the
encryption scheme, the structure of encrypted data obliges, by definition, that each
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entry saves a different value. This way we can obtain the same level of security as in
a probabilistic encryption scheme, even when the data structure is not in memory
when the process is running, and only showing information and access patterns when
it is time for the execution of operations (e.g. login operations).
We use data structures from the default JAVA Library. In SSPM we use HMAC-
SHA1 and AES encryption, both of theses cryptographic methods are imported from
the Javax crypto library.
We have several versions of SSPM and each one is organized in a different Java
class. To run these schemes, a Main class was created. All of the schemes can be
invoked by simply creating an object of the desired scheme, and simply run the
desired operations (login, register...).
4.2.1 Extending functionalities
A problem with the design of SSPM is that it depends on a cryptographic key and
it has to be saved near the database password. To prevent this security fail, we used
two different approaches: The use of TPMs (Trusted Platform Modules) as secure
specialized hardware devices that can save the cryptographic keys and make light
cryptographic operations. Also useful, is the use of new technologies of trustable
hardware in common CPUs, like Intel SGX, for the creation of reserved and secure
memory zones where the keys can be stored and operated securely. In the following
two sections we are going to explain in detail how we implemented our scheme using
the integration of TPM and Intel SGX, respectively.
In some schemes we use a Redis database to store the data and achieve persistence,
so the person that uses the SSPM can store all the information relative to the data
structures to be stored in another computer (through setting another host computer
to store the data), or in the same computer that SSPM is running (through local
host).
4.3 Using Trusted Platform Module
For the use of Trusted Platform Modules (TPM), we adapted the open source
code in Microsoft’s public repository at github, available in https://github.com/
Microsoft/TSS.MSR. We adapted this project to incorporate it in our API. We
made some changes to the code available, and added some operations to easily store
and retrieve a cryptographic key. The system that we made checks on start up, if
a TPM module exists in the users computer, so our scheme can connect to it. If it
does not exist a running TPM Simulator service is required to be running in the
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users computer, which we include in the folder of the SSPM versions that feature
TPM.
We implemented the SSPM variants that feature TPM, in JAVA, and also made
performance evaluations using the same programming language. The TPM can be
used using one or both of the following ways:
• All cryptographic operations, like hashing and encryption, are made inside the
TPM. This way, all keys are generated and stored in the TPM, and don’t leave
the module. Using this method, we do not reveal any access pattern to an
adversary, unless it has physical access to the computer where the password
database is stored. Although, we found out, that using this method is very
slow in both simulator mode and in hardware mode.
• This solution, which is faster, consists of only storing the cryptographic keys
inside the TPM, while all cryptographic operations are run in memory, as
normal. The adversary can also only obtain the keys if it has physical access
to the users computer. Although, this method is considerably faster it is less
secure than running all cryptographic operations inside the TPM, because it
may reveal some access patterns that an Adversary can take advantage of.
4.4 Using Intel SGX
To make use of Intel SGX we used the Software Development Kit that was officially
released by Intel in github, available in https://github.com/intel/linux-sgx.
Our scheme is only compatible with a Linux environment. We used C and C++
programming languages to produce the SSPM schemes that feature Intel SGX. We
implemented our system from the ground up in C++, for us to make us of this SDK
(Software Development Kit).
Inside the SGXs Enclave most normal data structures are not supported, for
security reasons. Some hashing and encryption schemes like HMAC-SHA1 and
AES encryption are not easily importable. To make use of hashing and encryption
operations we used the libsodium and libsodium-sgx libraries. Libsodium is an easy-
to-use software library for encryption, decryption, signatures, password hashing and
more, which is publicly available in https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium.
For another user to make use of our scheme, it must first install the Intel SGXs
SDK and libsodium libraries. More detailed information about installation can be
found in the repository of our scheme, which can be found in https://github.com/
Mgj645/sspm_c.
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In the final implementation of SGX in SSPM we use only a total of 3 ecalls.
During the calls of the ecall functions, at all times the length of the sent argument
must be specified, unless we send a value of fixed length, like an integer or a single
char. Here are the refereed ecalls:
1 ecall_init(DBPW , length );
2 ecall_hmac_this(code , userConcatenation , length );
3 ecall_newHMAC(DBPW , length)
The first ecall is part of the initialization process of the Enclave. The intent to
have a function to start, is for some variables to be initialized and assigned in case
it is the first time that this Enclave is ran. If this is the first time that the Enclave
is ran, the variable to be sent over an argument will be a null value, with the length
of 0. If it is not the first time, an encrypted database will be attempted to be read
from disk containing a hash map with the Usernames and the respective mapped
Passwords, and it will be sent over, for it to be unencrypted by the Enclave using
the unique key inside the CPU. Then the Enclave will generate a new HMAC-SHA1
key and create a new Users hash set (using the decrypted DBPW) and return it to
main memory.
The second ecall is for the program running in main memory to call when it has
to make a hashing operation, since the HMAC-SHA1 key does not leave the Enclave.
The function receives a code by the form of an Integer, that represents the type
of operation that the program in main memory is making, the Enclave saves this
information in a data structure called Log, so it can later update DBPW. The code
0 means it is a Register operation, 1 is Login, 2 is Change Username, 3 is Change
Password and 4 is Delete. The function divides the received userConcatenation (that
is a char array) based on the received code, there can be two or three keywords
inside this char array, so the division is important. After this the function returns
to the program in main memory the result of the HMAC-SHA1 operation.
The third ecall is only called periodically once every X seconds (the user that is
running can change theses values), by the program in main memory. One of the two
intuitions is to send the encrypted Database to the Enclave so it can decipher it and
update it using the Log that is stored inside the Enclave. This ecall also triggers
the Enclave to generate a new cryptographic key for the HMAC-SHA1 function and
uses the data of the deciphered DBPW to make a new Users hash set. After this,
SSPM encrypts the DBPW with the unique identifier of the CPU and returns it, as
well as the Users hash set.
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4.5 Evaluation Performance
In this section we are going to show the stress tests that we made. To run these
tests we used a computer with an Intel Core i5 6500 3.2 ghz com 4 cores CPU, 16
GB of Dual-Channel Ram with 2133 MHZ frequency, running on Windows 10 with
CPU Priority set to Very High, except for the tests made using SSPM SGX, that
were made in a Linux environment using the distro Linux Mint 19. We ran the same
tests at least five times, and the values that we present in the Figures below are the
the resulting average of these tests. We ran the same tests several times to make
sure that the obtained the most reliable resulting values, although the did not vary
much.
For a most realistic test of our schemes we obtained a big data set, consisting
of the most common Usernames and Passwords. For the Passwords, we used the
most common used Passwords on the Internet, based on a study of Internet secu-
rity and available online in the repository https://github.com/danielmiessler/
SecLists/tree/master/Passwords, that consists in analysing password database
leaks, that have been happening through the last years. For the usernames we used
the most common names in the English Language.
We compare every scheme that we implemented with the most basic version
of SSPM (SSPM V0 and SSPM V1) using Login and Register operations. The
other versions of SSPM include other security properties that could interfere in the
performance tests, so we only used these 2 versions.
4.5.1 PolyPasswordHasher
In this subsection we can see the performance comparison of our SSPM V1 scheme
with PolyPasswordHasher. For the evaluation in this example we used one and
ten thousand entries for the login and register operation and one, ten and hundred
thousand entries for the change username, change password and delete operations,
because these numbers are enough to obtain conclusive results, using our constructed
API and our big data set of usernames and passwords to make Register operations
followed by Login operations.
By our several tests, we can conclude that our scheme is considerably faster in
both Register and Login operation (as we can see in Figures 4.1 and 4.2]), as we only
use conventional cryptographic encryption based on HMACs, instead of threshold
cryptography. We can see that PolyPasswordHasher is fast with a small amount of
entries, but as the database grows the time to make an operation increases greatly.
To note that we see similar results for PolyPasswordHasher in Login and Register
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Figure 4.1: Database Performance with up to 10 000 entries, using SSPM and
PolyPasswordHasher - Login Operations
Figure 4.2: Database Performance with up to 100 000 entries, using SSPM and
PolyPasswordHasher - Register Operations
operations.
In Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 we can see the results of the performance comparison
between SSPM V1 and PolyPasswordHasher for the change username, change pass-
word and delete operations, respectively. In these operations PolyPasswordHasher is
shown to be a lot faster than its login and register operations, and is actually faster
than SSPM V1 up to ten thousand database entries, but as we already mentioned,
PolyPasswordHasher tends to have slow operations as the database grows, and is
about four times slower than SSPM V1, to make one hundred thousand operations.
With these results we conclude that PolyPasswordHasher is a good scheme for a
Password Database Scheme with a small amount of entries.
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Figure 4.3: Database Performance with up to 100 000 entries, using SSPM and
PolyPasswordHasher - Change Username Operations
Figure 4.4: Database Performance with up to 100 000 entries, using SSPM and
PolyPasswordHasher - Change Password Operations
4.5.2 B-Crypt
In Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 we can see the performance comparison between our
scheme and B-Crypt, using login and register operation. We used just 100 and 500
entries in this test, because it was enough entries to reveal that B-Crypt is so much
slower than our scheme. We think this major difference in performance is due to the
fact that B-Crypt uses multiple rounds of symmetric encryption while our scheme
only uses HMAC functions.
To better demonstrate the performance results of the Change Username, Change
Password and Delete operations we made the tables 4.1, 4.2 4.3, that respectively
show the results of the mentioned operations. We also used just 100 and 500 entries
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Figure 4.5: Database Performance with up to 100 000 entries, using SSPM and
PolyPasswordHasher - Delete Operations
Figure 4.6: Database Performance with up to 500 entries, using B-CRYPT and
SSPM V1 - Login Operations
Figure 4.7: Database Performance with up to 500 entries, using B-CRYPT and
SSPM V1 - Register Operations
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Table 4.1: Database Performance with up to 500 entries, using B-CRYPT and SSPM
V1 - Change Username Operations
Database Entries SSPM V1 B-CRYPT
100 16 ms. 15944 ms.
500 28 ms. 79449 ms.
Table 4.2: Database Performance with up to 500 entries, using B-CRYPT and SSPM
V1 - Change Password Operations
Database Entries SSPM V1 B-CRYPT
100 8 ms. 16002 ms.
500 10 ms. 79584 ms.
Table 4.3: Database Performance with up to 500 entries, using B-CRYPT and SSPM
V1 - Delete Operations
Database Entries SSPM V1 B-CRYPT
100 3 ms. 8017 ms.
500 6 ms. 39427 ms.
in these tests, because it was enough to show that B-CRYPT is much slower than
SSPM V1. We used tables to show the result of these operations, instead of the
usual graphics because the difference between SSPM V1 and B-CRYPT was just
too much to understand it through graph bars.
4.5.3 Intel SGX
In Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 we can show the performance test on login and register
operations that we made using our SGX integration in SSPM with SSPM V0 and
SSPM V1 tests also made here. We can see that the time it takes to complete the
amount of logins and sign ups is linear, and on average if it takes X time to make
1000 operations it will take X*10 time to make 10000 operations. Despite the fact
that SSPM SGX is a bit slower than the most conventional versions of our scheme,
its performance is very good with little overhead performance. We can see that the
difference between the version of SSPM that depends on SGX and those that do not,
do not show much of a difference in terms of time to make the login and register
operations.
In Figure 4.10, Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 we can see the results of the perfor-
mance comparison between SSPM V1, SSPM V0 and SSPM SGX for the change
username, change password and delete operations, respectively. We can note that
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Figure 4.8: Database Performance with up to 1M entries, using SSPM and SSPM
SGX - Login Operations
Figure 4.9: Database Performance with up to 1M entries, using SSPM and SSPM
SGX - Register Operations
SSPM SGX takes a bit longer during these operations than SSPM V0 and SSPM
V1, than in the login and register operations. This is mostly due to the fact, that
the change username and change password operations make more operations to
accomplish this result.
4.5.4 Other hashing Schemes
In this subsection we can see the performance comparison between our scheme
(version V0 and V1) and the most common hashing plus salt used today. We used
ten million entries, running the test three times to obtain the most possible conclusive
and fair results.
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Figure 4.10: Database Performance with up to 1M entries, using SSPM and SSPM
SGX - Change Username Operations
Figure 4.11: Database Performance with up to 1M entries, using SSPM and SSPM
SGX - Change Password Operations
In Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 we show the results of the login and register
operations respectively. Here we can see, as expected, the version V1 of our scheme
is somewhat slower than version V0. Also, as expected the plain text is faster than
all our secure versions of our schemes, and other hashing functions. The schemes
SHA-224 and SHA-1, present slightly better results than our scheme, while the
scheme SHA-3 is slightly slower in the login and register operations (which is normal,
because our scheme uses HMAC-SHA1). Also, in Figure 4.17 we can see the result of
the delete operations, which have similar results to the login and register operations,
although SSPM V1 was not as fast as expected.
In Figure 4.15 and Figure 4.16 we can see the results of the change usernames
and change passwords operations respectively. As we expected in the original design
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Figure 4.12: Database Performance with up to 1M entries, using SSPM and SSPM
SGX - Delete Operations
Figure 4.13: Database Performance with up to 10M entries, using various schemes -
Login Operations
of SSPM, both schemes are a lot slower in these operations, due to the higher amount
of operations needed to update the data structures inside SSPM.
We can view that simple hashing schemes are faster than our versions of SSPM,
although they are not as a secure way to store use’s passwords. As we were predicting,
SSPM shows its best results in the Login, Register and Delete operations and is only
a little slower than simple hashing schemes in these operations.
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Figure 4.14: Database Performance with up to 10M entries, using various schemes -
Register Operations
Figure 4.15: Database Performance with up to 10M entries, using various schemes -
Change Usernames Operations
4.6 Graphical User Interface
To better display the work we made during this thesis, we made a graphical user
interface showcasing the hashing schemes we implemented. The API we constructed
(Subsection 3.1.1) is exposed in this graphical interface. The layout of the application
can be seen in Figure 4.18. We used the library JAVA FX to design and implement
the application.
On the left side of the program we can select the scheme that we intend to
test, the schemes available are all those we implemented from existing literature or
from open source material. We don nott have PolyPasswordHasher in the interface,
because it has some restrictions in this scheme, namely the way this scheme stores
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Figure 4.16: Database Performance with up to 10M entries, using various schemes -
Change Passwords Operations
Figure 4.17: Database Performance with up to 10M entries, using various schemes -
Delete Operations
the users password, as it concatenates some users passwords together, so we choose
to not display PolyPasswordHasher in the interface as of right now. We can choose
to simulate some users to fill the database, using the form in the bottom left, that
makes use of our big data collection of usernames and passwords. Please note that
the data collection (the Usernames.txt and Passwors.txt) must be inside the right
directory for this option to work.
The operations form makes use of our universal API, and works the same way for
all schemes. We can choose any of the operations available. The console below shows
if the instruction was successful. We also have a console showing how much time in
ms it took to made the operations when users are simulated using the bottom left
form.
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Figure 4.18: Graphical Interface
On the right side of the application we have a view of how the entries on the
database are stored.
In Figure 4.18 we can see an example of how the execution of application can
turn out to be. In this example we have chosen the MD5 scheme and simulated 5
users. Furthermore we registered one user manually, through the form in the middle,
and the result of its database is on the right column of the application.
If the user chooses our SSPM scheme in the left column, it will be prompted with
a pop up window as shown in Figure 4.19. This will ask the user what properties of
the SSPM scheme will it want to use, before launching the scheme. This uses the
version of SSPM that we consider final, that is described in subsection 3.2.1
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Figure 4.19: Graphical Interface - SSPM Options
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Conclusion
In this chapter we give our final thoughts on what was accomplished during the
work developed in this thesis and how this work can be later resumed by another
researcher.
5.1 Final Remarks
In this thesis we proposed a new password database management scheme called
SSPM (Simple Secure Password Management). SSPM allows for the administrators
of websites to store the users credentials in a simple, safe and secure manner. The
methodology of SSPM is based on Searchable Symmetric Encryption techniques and
encrypted data structures that does not allow adversaries that get a snapshot copy
of the database, to decipher it, even when using offline attacks, suck as brute force
attacks, dictionary attacks or using rainbow tables.
In the first part of this thesis we implemented SSPM in Java, along with the
most common hashing schemes today and other used schemes, such as B-Crypt and
PolyPasswordHasher, constructing an universal API for the most common password
database operations. Several performance tests were performed using different sce-
narios, like making tests that involved the sign up of up to 10 million users, using
the implemented API, for each scheme. By doing this we were able to compare the
performance and conditions of the database password management schemes. We
also created a version of SSPM that stores the data in a Redis server.
We also used TPM in an alternative version of SSPM, to store and keep the
cryptographic keys. We also tested a way to use the TPM to run all hashing and
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encryption functions, but we found this method to be very slow. We found that only
storing the keys in the TPM is the best way to use it. We kept both versions of our
implementation of SSPM using TPM, so that others can test it if they desire. Our
results of TPM were not very satisfactory as TPM showed to be very slow to make
cryptographic operations, although it was a good, secure way of storing the needed
cryptographic keys.
For us to use Intel SGX (Intel’s Software Guards Extensions) we had to implement
our scheme in C and C++ language, in a Linux environment, because we used the
official Linux SDK available in Intel’s online repository of GitHub. This SDK only
works in an Linux environment. We concluded with our benchmarks, that Intel SGX
has very little overhead performance, even when required to make a lot of operations
at the same time, making it perfect to use on our password database schemes, and
we have also proven that this technology made by Intel has the capabilities to also
work in other areas, due to its security measures and good performance.
The results that we obtained, show that SSPM is a bit slower than the conven-
tional hashing plus salt schemes, although it offers better security measurements
against attacks made by adversaries. The inclusion of Hardware Secure Platforms,
such as TPM and Intel SGX, only reinforced these security measures. On the con-
trary, SSPM revealed to be much faster then other password database, such as
B-Crypt and PolyPasswordHasher.
The API that we implemented works for all mentioned schemes, and offers the
basic operations of a password database management scheme and it is simple to
use, what allows to any person to download and test our work, making it to any
other fitting project. We also designed a graphical interface that makes use of our
universal API, so that the we can better demonstrate ours and other schemes. Our
work is available online in the following github repositories: https://github.com/
Mgj645/Thesis_crypts and https://github.com/Mgj645/sspm_c , and the work
will continue to be updated in the following months.
5.2 Future Work
In this section we state the work that we believe that can be improved to the work
already done during the course of this thesis:
• With Intel SGX, the encrypted database that can be used to recover the User’s
credentials requires the CPU unique key that initially encrypted it. This poses
a problem if the CPU malfunctions as the data will be gone forever. Work in
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Intel SGX can be done to make the migration of the original CPU to a new
one.
• Implementation of a Redis integrated system in the SGX variant of our scheme.
Right now the encrypted data is stored in the disk where the scheme is running.
• Repartition of the Users database, so the most recently accessed users cre-
dentials are kept in a different data structure accessed in memory, and other
later accessed users credentials are kept in disk. The objective of this is to
not occupy the memory too much, specially when the users database gets
increasingly bigger with the passing of time.
• Remove some bugs that are left by Intel’s SDK of SGX, and keep it updated
as new versions of SGX are released by Intel.
• Integration of SSPM SGX in the GUI application. We did not include the SGX
variant in the application because it was programmed in a different language
and a way to pass the String formed in Java to C++ would require a way to
encapsulate the data, like a JSON document.
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